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Legacies of Place and Power: From Military Base to Freeport Zone 
Victoria Reyes 
Bryn Mawr College 
Abstract 
This article examines the place-making of global borderlands—semi-autonomous, foreign-
controlled geographical locations geared toward international exchange. I use the case 
study of the Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ), Philippines as an example of a global 
borderland that resides within a space formerly occupied by a colonial power. I show how 
elite Filipinos adapted and transformed the spatial boundaries the U.S. military initially 
erected.  The earlier boundaries differentiating Americans from Filipinos and military 
personnel from civilians, helped the native elite to perpetuate familiar patterns of 
inequality based on nationality, class, and skin color. This differentiation occurs through 
(1) the indirect and direct exclusion of the poor vis-à-vis the SBFZ’s socio-spatial 
organization, and (2) the maintenance of cultural practices (litter, traffic) and moral 
discourses (of what is “good” and “bad”) formerly associated with the base, so that the 
SBFZ remains distinct from the surrounding city of Olongapo. Places of power have 
legacies, structural and spatial residues that continue to influence cultural practices and 
discourses even after the original uses of a place are transformed.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 In recent years, sociologists have begun to recognize the importance of place—a 
geographic location filled with meaning that is both an independent variable and a 
mediator of social life (Gieryn, 2000; Paulsen, 2004). This article examines the place-
making of global borderlands—semi-autonomous, foreign-controlled geographical 
locations geared toward international exchange (Reyes, in press). Global borderlands 
include sites such as overseas military bases, special economic zones, tourist resorts, 
embassies, headquarters of international organizations, and international branch campuses 
of universities. These locations are particularly important to examine because they are 
spaces where the first and third worlds meet, and where unequal interactions between 
people of different nationalities, classes, races/ethnicities, and genders are routinized. 
They are also found all over the world. For example, the United States had a total of 750 
overseas bases in 45 countries and territories in 2010 (United States Department of 
Defense, 2010, p. 9); there are over 3,000 Special Economic Zones in 135 countries 
(FIAS, 2008); and tourism is the “world’s biggest business” (Goldstone, 2001, p. 2). Each 
of these institutions transforms local economies and involves unequal financial, cultural, 
and social exchange.  
 Studies of place and space tend to focus on spatial organization and/or social and 
cultural meanings. This article follows in the footsteps of urban cultural sociologists who 
emphasize how these two factors mutually reinforce one another (Paulsen, 2004; Borer, 
2006). To examine global borderlands, I conduct a case study of the Subic Bay Freeport 
Zone (SBFZ), a postcolonial site in the Philippines. The U.S. took control of the islands in 
1898, and from 1901 until 1992, the SBFZ was home to the former U.S. Subic Bay Naval 
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Base (SBNB). After the U.S. military’s withdrawal, local Filipinos occupied the space and 
transformed it into a Freeport.  It is a strategic research site in which to study the varied 
forms of interaction that occur between groups precisely because of the combination of its 
colonial military history and its current focus of attracting international businesses and 
tourists. Additionally, because the SBFZ occupies the same physical space as the former 
SBNB, it allows one to investigate how colonial socio-spatial organization, cultural 
practices, and moral discourses still influence the modern era.  
 Given that local Filipinos took over the physical location of the SBNB and 
transformed it into a Freeport Zone, what happened to the leftover built environment and 
socio-spatial organization of the U.S. military? Do certain American practices continue, 
and if so, how and why? What meanings do local workers, local visitors, and foreign 
visitors give to this space? To answer these questions I combine what Borer (2006) 
identifies as the Urban Cultural perspective, which emphasizes that narratives and 
symbolism “play essential roles in the social life of cities” (p. 183), and the Urban 
Political Economy perspective, which stresses that culture depends on broader structural 
forces. I find that the boundaries initially erected by the US military, which served to 
differentiate Americans from Filipinos and military personnel from civilians, were 
adopted and transformed by elite Filipinos to perpetuate familiar patterns of inequality 
based on nationality, class, and skin color. From these patterns, I argue that places of 
power have legacies, structural and spatial residues that continue to influence interactions, 
practices, and discourses even after the transformation of a place’s original uses.  
 I first outline the influence of socio-spatial organization and history on cities, then 
describe how boundary-making cultural practices and moral discourses differentiate 
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places. Next, I briefly introduce the SBFZ setting and discuss my data and methodology. 
Finally, I present my findings: how the SBFZ’s socio-spatial organization directly and 
indirectly excludes the poor, and how cultural practices related to order and disorder and 
moral discourses of “good” and “bad”—both formerly associated with the military base—
continue to differentiate the SBFZ from the surrounding city of Olongapo.  
INEQUALITY AND POST-COLONIAL SOCIO-SPATIAL ORGANIZATION 
 Research on spatial organization examines relative locations, geographical 
patterns, and these patterns’ consequences (Logan, 2012). Social relations are spatially 
and hierarchically organized, and a large body of sociological research identifies these 
patterns and consequences (Massey, 2005; Gottdiener, 1985). Territoriality—the control 
of space—is a social process, and “stratification of places” creates advantages and 
disadvantages (Lyman and Scott, 1967; Logan, 1978). In this way, power and privilege are 
reproduced socially and spatially.  
 Much of the literature on cities, spaces, and inequality focuses on global cities—
their internal spatial polarization and where they rank globally (Forrest, La Grange, and 
Yip, 2004; Sassen, 2001[1991]; Smith and Timberlake, 2001). The literature on colonial 
and postcolonial settings also shows how power and privilege are reproduced through 
space. For example, the physical patterns of colonial urbanization reflected socioeconomic 
classes and distinctions between groups (Yeoh, 2000; Shlay and Rosen, 2010; Myers, 
1995). In colonial Vietnam, this is seen through the differences between residences in the 
French Quarter versus elsewhere, and who occupies which residences (Peycam, 2013). 
In Southeast Asia, cities are also characterized by the elite’s increasing shift from 
public to private space (Yeoh, 2005; Connell, 1999). For example, Manila is an 
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increasingly privatized city, where public spaces are transforming into private ones. The 
result is a stark socio-spatial polarization between rich and poor. Similar to gated 
communities and fortified enclaves found around the world, the wealthy live in carefully 
planned and self-governed spaces that exclude the working poor and unhoused (Shatkin, 
2005/2006; Shatkin, 2008; Berner and Korff, 1995; Porio, 2012).  
 However, these highly segregated places—whether upscale malls, exclusive 
residential communities, or tax-free economic zones—are often imposed on local spaces, 
displacing the poor. In contrast, when the American military took over Olongapo City, it 
was still a small fishing village that housed a small and unorganized Spanish artillery. 
Once the base was erected, its gated entrances served as barriers against unwanted 
Filipinos—non-workers and unescorted guests.  These barriers were institutionalized over 
a period of almost one hundred years. However, once the U.S. military withdrew, local 
Filipinos physically took over the SBNB to keep it from being looted, and petitioned the 
national government to create the Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ). This area went from 
housing one type of global borderland for almost one century, to housing a different type, 
spurred by native efforts. This raises important questions. What happened to the leftover 
American military structures? Did locals strive to maintain, or erase and cover any 
connection with the American-built physical structures and spatial layout? 
BOUNDARY-MAKING CULTURAL PRACTICES  
 The meanings that people use to define themselves and places directly and indirectly 
involve boundary making by differentiating between “us” and “them” or “ours” and 
“theirs.” Geographic boundaries carry symbolic meanings that enforce social boundaries 
(Lamont and Molnar, 2002). Chicago School and contemporary ethnographies show how 
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the spatial organization of where people work, live, avoid, and visit influences their lives 
(e.g. Drake and Cayton, 1993 [1945]; Duneier, 2000). Places’ imageries, characters, and 
cultures also have implications for policy, and symbolize “who belongs,” thus implying 
who does not belong (Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen, 2000; Zukin, 1995).  
The meanings that people assign to cultural objects are not static; rather, they are 
malleable and depend on context (Griswold, 1987; Milligan, 1998). For postcolonial 
spaces, these meanings and practices become particularly important and are continually 
negotiated, contested, and manipulated to promote certain ideologies and distinctions 
including those related to national and cultural identities, myths, and economic 
advancement (Clarke, 2007; Yeoh, 1996; Kusno, 1998). For example, Low (1993) 
demonstrates how postcolonial Mexico City is a symbolic site of tension because 
discourses over excavation rights and control over space include references to the past, 
while Yeoh (2000) details how Singapore’s government officials sought to reshape the 
nation’s historical and contemporary narratives by transforming ethnic communities into 
“Historic Districts.” Similarly, Manila’s segregation derives not only from the city’s 
socio-spatial organization, but also from people’s “sense of place,” where “certain types of 
places (enclaves or slums) or the people associated with those places elicit certain 
introspective states (mental states, including affect and motivation), which, in turn, 
predispose certain segregating practices” (Garrido, 2013a, p. 1344). These practices 
include varied consumption patterns, including housing (Connell, 1999).  
The segregated spaces of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are global borderlands. 
They are tax-free areas within countries that are meant to attract foreign businesses and 
investment, and the dynamics that separate these enclosed spaces from their surrounding 
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communities are instances of the privatization and segregation of cities.  Much of the 
research on SEZs focuses on structures and practices that have created, increased, and 
perpetuated the feminization of global labor and the gendered discourses and organization 
of work which often involves low-wage employment with minimal labor protections and 
job security (Mills, 2003; Nash and Fernandez-Kelly, 1983; Lee, 1995).  
While some scholars have argued that SEZs represent “exceptional spaces of 
neoliberalism” (Ong, 2006), others contend that workers experience these zones as a 
continuation of the informal labor processes that occur outside them (Chen, 1995; Cross, 
2010). A key focus is how these spaces are differentiated from others by specific 
practices. For example, Sklair (1991) and Bach (2010) show how the Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone and its surrounding villages maintain distinct appearances through 
practices related to order and disorder, which are also associated with particular 
discourses. For example, these differences create a symbolic story—“if Shenzhen is a 
narrative about speed, progress and civilization, its villages serve as the narrative’s other” 
(Bach, 2010, p. 422). Similarly, in Philippine FZs, corporations can avoid “unwanted,” 
pro-union workers and cultivate a compliant workforce through the practice of requiring 
barangay (neighborhood) clearance passes (Kelly, 2001). As an American military base, 
the SBNB had particular practices that differentiated it from Olongapo City. Now that it is 
a Philippine Freeport Zone, are there particular cultural practices from the American 
military era that continue, or have local Filipinos erased these associations? If certain 
practices continue, what role do they play in the current place-making of the SBFZ? 
MORALITY AND PLACE 
 Morality and moral discourses are another way to construct boundaries. Like 
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cultural boundaries, moral boundaries reflect structural conditions, geographic locations, 
and lifestyles, and are based on group characteristics (Lamont and Molnar, 2002). By 
moral discourses, I mean the socially and historically constructed “understandings of good 
and bad, right and wrong, worthy and unworthy that vary between persons and between 
social groups” (Hitlin and Vaisey, 2013, p. 55).  
 One type of moral ordering revolves around dirt and pollution. Mary Douglas (2008 
[1966]) argues that categorizations of “dirty” and “clean” are products of systemic 
ordering and classification. Societies use different definitions of acceptability and 
prohibitions, and these reflect symbolic patterns that maintain status and social order by 
shaping social relations. For example, in the U.S., litter is perceived as a sign of disorder, 
something negative, unwanted, and avoided, and an indicator of a “bad” neighborhood 
(Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004; Wilson and Kelling, 1982). Littered neighborhoods, or 
people who live in them, are seen as “dirty” and “dangerous,” whereas other 
neighborhoods and people are seen as “clean” and “safe.” These distinctions reflect and 
maintain social stratification.  
 American colonialism in the Philippines also provides an example of how these 
boundaries are constructed, because it was rooted in efforts to “civilize” Filipinos through 
practices related to hygiene and the construction of “healthy” versus “diseased” (Anderson 
2006). In modern Metro Manila, gated communities and other policed and exclusionary 
zones are similarly linked to notions of order as “good.” These communities provide a 
respite from the disorder of the rest of the city (Murphy and Hogan, 2012). Indeed, 
Garrido (2013b) specifies that the elites’ exclusive spaces—upscale shopping malls, 
residential communities, and business centers—are seen as “modern” and “rational,” a 
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“model” that serves as a direct contrast to the “disorder” of the rest of Manila. This 
differentiation of space by morality and order also extends to Manila’s public parks 
(Yotsumoto, 2013).  
 Another type of moral ordering revolves around overseas military bases, a particular 
type of global borderland. Many researchers have examined bases’ symbolic 
representations, linking them to disparities in class structure, material goods, national 
identity, and crimes in places such as Okinawa, Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines 
(Inoue, 2004; Morris and Dunkelberger, 1998; Cooley and Marten, 2006; Ralston and 
Keeble, 2009). In particular, U.S. overseas military bases are often seen as an extension of 
America’s empire, and researchers focus on the immoralities associated with base life, 
including prostitution, sexism, racism, gender-based crimes, environmental hazards and 
the impact they have on the next generation, the extralegal status of soldiers, and the 
maintenance of political and economic domination (Go and Foster, 2003; Schirmer and 
Shalom, 1987; Lutz 2009).  
 In this article, I refer to hegemony—the historically and socially constructed ideals 
and values of a dominant actor that are imposed on others (Gramsci, 2010[1971])—and to 
the disparate power imbalances that exist between the U.S. and Philippines, where power 
is seen as the ability of an actor “to carry out his own will despite resistance” (Weber, 
1978, p. 53). I focus on both parties and note how the non-hegemon, or the actor with less 
power (in this case, Philippine officials), still has agency and can manipulate the “rules of 
the game” to achieve its own aims.  
 I purposely do not use the term “neocolonialism,” because I believe referring to 
hegemony or power imbalances is a more accurate portrayal of U.S.–Philippine relations. 
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The differences in the global fields—a relational approach to studying the material and 
cultural dynamics within the international arena (Go, 2008)—during America’s colonial 
era and today are distinct, and should not be overlooked. In the colonial age, an imperial 
power could kill with impunity, and rule its colony, directly or indirectly, as ruthlessly or 
benevolently as it wished, with little concern for other world powers. Today, however, 
states have audiences—governmental, international, non-governmental, and other civil 
actors—that can hold them accountable (the varied impact of this accountability is an 
empirical question), and these actors can mobilize technology to broaden the impact of 
their messages and critique worldwide those who overstep their limits. These constraints 
influence how states act. Additionally, a focus on neocolonialism tends to downplay local 
actors’ agency in the shaping the foreign bases, while I focus precisely on the agency of 
various local actors. 
 Though the scholarship that focuses on overseas military bases tends to focus on the 
people who are most disenfranchised, the U.S. military cannot and/or would not maintain 
a presence where it is universally unwanted.  Indeed, local political elites often desire a 
military presence.  This allows the U.S. to maintain bases in foreign countries (Cooley, 
2008; Thompson, 1975). This leads to important questions regarding the variability of 
discourses associated with the base and other types of global borderlands, and how these 
differ depending on whether people lived in the area, worked inside the particular global 
borderland in their community, or were excluded. I am particularly interested in locals 
who worked with and/or visited both the former U.S. military base and the current 
SBFZ—what are their understandings and thoughts regarding these exclusive spaces? 
How do they compare this space to the surrounding Olongapo City? Given that the SBFZ 
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occupies the same physical space as the former SBNB, do discourses associated with the 
American military continue to influence the moral ordering of the SBFZ and Olongapo 
City, and if so, how?  
SUBIC BAY FREEPORT ZONE, PHILIPPINES 
 While under American colonial rule, Subic Bay came to house the United States’ 
largest overseas naval base. SBNB was home to the Navy’s Seventh Fleet; it was 
composed of 30,380 acres, five major facilities, and a refugee center on Grande Island 
(Bowen, 1986). These facilities were strategically significant for the U.S. and 
economically and politically important for the Philippines (United States, 1965; United 
States, 1985; United States, 1986; McLaurin III, 1990; Storey and Thayer, 2001).  Under 
the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States, the 
U.S. did not pay rent for the bases; however, these bases were bundled with millions of 
dollars in economic and military aid, the levels of which were continually negotiated 
(United States, 1988).  
 Philippine politicians, particularly Ferdinand Marcos and Corazon Aquino, were 
adept at manipulating the bases’ symbolism and ideology to further political agendas 
(Suter, 1986). For example, Marcos was skilled at manipulating public platforms to make 
demands on the U.S. for his domestic constituents, while simultaneously negotiating with 
U.S. officials in private and ensuring them of his support (United States, 1991; Thompson, 
1975; Cooley, 2008). Similarly, Aquino1 was able to unite a broad range of coalitions, 
including anti-American and anti-base movements, to form the People’s Power Movement 
that ousted Marcos from power (Cristobal and Gregor, 1987). However, Aquino’s anti-
base rhetoric was not permanent. Before her election, she softened her stance and 
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proposed a popular referendum to decide the matter (United States, 1986). She did so not 
only because of the importance of American aid, but also because local public opinion 
polls suggested that a majority preferred the military to stay, and various ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) partners encouraged the retention of the bases 
(United States, 1985; United States, 1991; United States, 1992; United States, 1986; 
Chung, 2004). Negotiations to extend the agreement were in progress when Typhoon 
Yunya and the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo destroyed Clark Air Force Base (CAFB). This 
caused the U.S. to withdraw from Clark, and significantly changed the negotiations.2 
Although U.S. and Philippine officials reached an agreement that included the SBNB, but 
not the CAFB,3 the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed treaty4that fell shy of the two-
thirds majority required for ratification. Aquino initially pushed to put the issue to a public 
vote; however, she eventually supported the Senate’s decision (United States, 1991).  
 Although the base was dismantled in 1992, this did not indicate the end of the U.S. 
military in Subic or in the Philippines. In addition to continuing to honor the 1951 Mutual 
Defense Treaty that unites the Philippines and U.S. when either is attacked in the Pacific, 
in 1998, the two governments signed the Visiting Forces Agreement, which details the 
rights and responsibilities of each nation when U.S. military and civilian personnel visit 
the Philippines for military training and exercises. Some have always contested the U.S. 
military presence in the Philippines, and the symbolism of this relationship can be seen 
through the 2005–2009 Subic Rape Case. “Nicole,” a pseudonym given to the victim by 
the courts and media to protect her identity, was allegedly raped by Lance Corporal Daniel 
Smith in the SBFZ. He was initially found guilty of rape by the Philippine court system, 
but the decision was overturned on appeal. The media and some judges saw this case as 
 13 
representing continued U.S. hegemony and Philippine dependence.  
 The unequal relationship between the two continues today. In 2012, the U.S. 
accounted for 10.22 percent ($7.55 billion) of imports, and 12.26 percent ($8.85 billion) of 
exports,5 while the Philippines received $129,434,000 in non-military aid and $27,000,000 
in U.S. military aid.6 However, the economic role of Asian and Pacific countries is 
steadily increasing. For example, the Philippines received 12.64 percent ($9.34 billion) of 
its imports and sent 23.04 percent ($16.6 billion) of its exports to China and 11.35 percent 
($8.39 billion) of its imports and 13.12 percent ($9.47 billion) of its exports to Japan.  
 The end of a permanent U.S. base marked the beginning of the SBFZ. In anticipation 
of the military pullout, the Philippine government created the SBFZ through Republic Act 
7227 that laid out the goals of the SBFZ. The SBFZ is a “separate customs territory” 
aimed to be a “self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center 
[that] generate[s] employment opportunities in and around the zone and [that] attract[s] 
and promote[s] productive foreign investments.” Although businesses in the zone do not 
have to pay taxes, they do have to pay a flat rate—originally three percent of their gross 
income—allocated thus: “one percent (1%) each to the local government units affected by 
the declaration of the zone in proportion to their population area, and … a development 
fund of one percent (1%) … to be utilized for the development of municipalities outside 
the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, and other municipalities contiguous 
to base areas.” Adhering to environmental standards, including maintaining the forests 
inside the SBFZ, and establishing educational and medical institutions, are also part of this 
founding document.  
 In this text, the goal of the SBFZ was to create a self-sustaining, tax-free zone 
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geared toward foreign investment, while simultaneously generating profit to better its 
surrounding communities. However, the handbook designed to regulate and outline the 
specific rules of the SBFZ delineated particular rights, including, but not limited to tax-
free incentives for Filipino and foreign SBFZ residents. Non-residents were limited to how 
much they could purchase and take out of the SBFZ each month, though consumption 
within the area was unlimited. SBFZ passes were also required to separate SBFZ 
residents, employers, and employees from those whom did not have any SBFZ affiliation.  
 The SBFZ functions very similar to a city, where the Subic Bay Metropolitan 
Authority (SBMA), the governing body of the SBFZ, regulates everything inside its 
borders—from trash collection to security vis-à-vis its own police force. I examine the 
SBFZ Harbor Point mall, in particular, because its April 2012 opening brought with it an 
influx of locals who normally would not enter the area. It thus provides an opportunity to 
examine how racial/ethnic, class, and nationality distinctions interact with potentially 
changing cultural meanings and institutions associated with global borderlands (see Figure 
1).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 This article is based on nine months of fieldwork, conducted over three time periods 
in a single year. In the spirit of classical ethnographic studies (e.g. Gans, 1962; Stack, 
1974), I moved into an apartment in Olongapo City, outside the SBFZ, to conduct 
participant observation of daily life (e.g., shopping at local food markets, using local 
transportation, visiting local businesses, and volunteering with organizations). I focused 
on observing the differences between being inside or outside the SBFZ, to which I 
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traveled almost daily. My ethnographic data include observations of popular spaces of 
interactions and non-interactions with a particular focus on differences in gender, class, 
and nationality, and between facilities geared toward foreigners and locals. I also paid 
close attention to not only “what they say” but “what they do,” as well as “what is there” 
and “what is not there.” 
 To better understand the various meanings different types of people attach to this 
place, I also conducted 47 in-depth, semi-structured interviews of foreign visitors, local 
visitors, and local workers, as well as a survey of hotel managers inside the SBFZ. In-
depth interviews help researchers learn meanings and collective understandings (Orbuch, 
1997). Interviews with foreign visitors were conducted in English. I am also an 
intermediate speaker of Filipino (Tagalog), one of the Philippines’ national languages, and 
interviews with local workers and local visitors were conducted in Tagalog, except when 
interviewees requested English. I recruited interviewees by handing out flyers in Harbor 
Point mall, one of the SBFZ’s most intensively used spaces. Initial respondents then 
referred others, making this a snowball sample.  
 Five of the seventeen Harbor Point employees interviewed were male, twelve were 
female. Only two (one male, one female) were un-partnered—they had neither a 
boyfriend/girlfriend nor a spouse.  Most contributed to their family’s income by giving 
money directly to their family on payday or by sending money to the province if they were 
renting a room in the area. Harbor Point mall employees were paid a range from 330 to 
491 Philippine pesos (Php) per day, which translates to 5,520Php to 7,920Php a month, 
based on a six-day work week. Employees of other SBFZ businesses may differ in their 
salary. The local Filipino visitors I interviewed came from a broader spectrum of 
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socioeconomic statuses. For example, a Filipino contractor to the SBFZ’s government 
made 100,000 Php monthly, while the two schoolteachers I interviewed from a non-SBFZ 
neighborhood made 10,000Php and 20,000Php per month, respectively. Foreign visitors 
also came from varied socio-economic statuses. Missionaries raised money prior to their 
trip, while a Peace Corps Volunteer made 150 Php per day—less than Harbor Point 
employees. In contrast, an Australian businessman who recently started a SBFZ business 
estimates his yearly salary to be one million Philippine pesos per year, plus an additional 
18,000 Australian dollars (AUD). At a 36 PhP to 1AUD exchange rate, this amounts to 
1,648,000Php per year or 137,333 Php per month—more than the government contractor 
previously mentioned. Similarly, a British businessman did not want to reveal a range of 
his yearly or monthly income because he made “quite a lot” of money. In sum, there are 
stark asymmetries in wages among and between these groups. 
 Finally, I collected documents that detail rules and regulations from the Subic Bay 
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), the governing body of the SBFZ, and I conducted more 
than a dozen informal, informational interviews with SBMA officials and other people I 
encountered during my daily routine. I also collected documents from the Digital National 
Security Archives and the National Archives and Records Administration’s Access to 
Archival Databases—which provided important information about SBNB—and 428 U.S. 
and Republic of the Philippines (R.P.) legal cases using Lexis-Nexis, Westlaw, 
lawphil.net, and ChanRobles’ Virtual Law Library. 
 Using a cultural and relational analytic approach to the data, which emphasizes the 
role of culture and relationships in economic activity (Zelizer 2005), I highlight the 
SBFZ’s socio-spatial organization, cultural practices, and moral discourses, and how these 
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compare to Olongapo City. By culture, I refer to the complex, rule-like structures that are 
shaped by individual and societal resources, and which people use strategically, but 
inconsistently (DiMaggio, 1997; Swidler, 1986). I also account for what Lamont (1992) 
calls proximate structures—the individual resources people use and encounter in their 
environment—and remote structures—the societal characteristics of the nations in which 
people live. This approach highlights how people’s discourses, practices, and 
understandings shape, and are shaped by, their own, their community’s, and their nation’s 
cultural, social, and economic backgrounds. By interviewing workers and visitors to 
SBFZ, I focus specifically on those included in this space. In doing so, I chose not to focus 
on those excluded from these sites, including prostitutes, activists, and the poor. However, 
these voices have been the focus of critical and feminist researchers, who use the bases 
and Freeport Zones as symbols of U.S. imperialism and Philippine dependence (Kirk, 
1998; Enloe, 2000 [1990]; Go, 2011).  
A note on reflexivity: I am a mixed Filipino American academic woman whose 
family continues to reside in the Subic barangay (neighborhood) of Olongapo City. In 
examining the experiences of middle- and upper-class Filipinos and foreigners in the 
Philippines, I am documenting a place and writing about lives that, while somewhat 
familiar, are also often relatively disadvantaged compared to my own. How might my 
social position affect my work? One major concern is that it might limit or change what 
my Filipino respondents say when discussing their perceptions of the U.S. However, in 
previous research in the Philippines, I interviewed activists, students, and academics who 
shared the aforementioned critical perspective. In another project, I spoke with mothers of 
Amerasian children, children whose fathers are American military men and whose 
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mothers are Filipinas. One of my interviewees discussed her frustration at being used by 
researchers and her distaste for the American military. In my experience, people in the 
Philippines tend to share their anti-U.S. and anti-military views easily; in some cases, 
people were even more eager to talk to me because they assumed that as a Filipino 
American, I shared this perspective.  
STRATIFICATION OF SPACE 
 The Setting 
The U.S. military built the “Main” or Magsaysay Gate, and it was the SBNB’s 
primary pedestrian entrance for U.S. and Philippine military personnel and civilians (see 
Figure 2). Around the gate are signs. Some are official, warning of a curfew for minors or 
that all employees and students must have their IDs visible. Others advertise events at SM 
mall—the mall just outside the SBFZ, as well as Harbor Point—the mall just inside the 
FZ, and other venues. There is a guard station at the gate, and the door is often wide open, 
with two or three guards sitting and/or standing around it. The guards, with guns and 
batons holstered on their hips, watch people as they walk through the gate’s queues. Daily, 
I observed students and workers checking their lanyards to make sure their IDs were 
easily seen. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
The Main Gate is one of many structures taken over by SBMA officials and 
Filipino volunteers when the military withdrew and left behind an estimated $8 billion in 
infrastructure (Bowen Jr, Leinbach, and Mabazza, 2002). The spatial layout of these 
facilities was originally planned to differentiate officers from enlisted men, and work areas 
from leisure areas. How did local Filipinos use the leftover built environment and socio-
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spatial organization? I argue that elite Filipinos adapted the spatial legacies left behind by 
a former colonial and military power to reproduce inequalities in two ways, through the 
direct and indirect exclusion of the poor. 
Direct Exclusion of the Poor, Preference for Foreigners  
The Philippines is a class-based society with racial and ethnic disparities that were 
institutionalized during Spanish rule. These racial/ethnic and skin color boundaries are not 
a definitive color line (DuBois, 1903); rather, they rely on a more permeable color 
gradient. With the exception of indigenous groups such as the Aetas, who share a distinct 
phenotype and continue to be displaced and occupy the lowest rung of the socio-economic 
and educational ladders,7 Philippine race relations are similar to those found in Brazil, 
where race refers to skin color or physical appearance, and where national dialogues of 
race mixing (of the Spanish in particular) are romanticized (Telles, 2004).8 For example, 
high-status, light-skinned urban families of Spanish descent are at the top, followed by 
those of Filipino-Chinese descent, and indigenous, dark-skinned Filipinos are at the 
bottom of the hierarchy (Karnow, 1989; Francia, 2010). Additionally, when the U.S. 
military withdrew, it left behind an estimated 50,000 Amerasians, children with Filipina 
mothers and American military fathers (De Leon, 2012); these children, particularly those 
with African American fathers, are also routinely discriminated against (Gastardo-Conaco 
and Israel-Sobritchea, 1999).  
Philippine class and racial/ethnic inequalities are evident in the direct and indirect 
exclusion of the poor, who are often dark-skinned, from the SBFZ. The direct exclusion 
occurs through the control over who enters. The first step in this process relies on the 
bridge leading to the gated entrance. Aside from the holiday season, vendors selling food, 
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gum, candy, and the like stay near the bridge’s entrance, with only rosary sellers and the 
mga pulubi (beggars) operating further down the bridge, providing a setting of routinized 
unequal interactions. The vendors and pulubi have a captive audience passing through: the 
relatively more wealthy foreign and Filipino workers and visitors to the SBFZ.  
 The guarded entrance to the SBFZ serves as a barrier against these interactions, 
keeping out mga pulubi and informal vendors. SBMA laws require all vendors in the 
SBFZ to be registered, and require residents, employers, employees, and students to apply 
and pay for SBMA IDs, which serve as gate passes. The exclusion is normalized, and it is 
very rare for vendors and beggars to try to enter the prohibited area. In the nine months I 
traveled daily to the SBFZ, I witnessed this happening twice, and the guards turned them 
away. The IDs serve as an entrance pass, but daily shoppers and visitors are not required 
to have them. Signs inform the public that guards have the authority to search any people, 
bags, and items entering or leaving the area (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, 1992). 
Aside from gate pass requirements, no formal laws specify which categories of people are 
allowed or denied entry. In an informal conversation, a Harbor Point worker said that 
there are no formal laws, but that mga pulubi are kept out to maintain order. An SBMA 
Law Enforcement official I interviewed clarified in a follow-up email: 
There are no specific rules as to who are “allowed” to enter the Subic Bay Freeport Zone ... as 
it says, Freeport ... so everyone is welcome, for as long as they obey the laws being 
implemented, i.e. traffic rules (with or without a SBMA police on the road, they have to follow 
the rules. na-observe mo naman un dba [you observed that, no] when u were here. It's like, un 
kasi ang 'na-impart ng mga [because want to impart the] US serviceman when the area was 
still a U.S. Naval Base. kaya [able to] strictly enforced ang traffic rules). Under Chapter X, 
Other Provisions, Section 97, Security: Function of SBMA Security Force. SBMA security 
force agents shall police and maintain law and order within the boundaries of the Subic Bay 
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Freeport. Access into and departure from the SBFZ shall be fully controlled by SBMA security 
agents (e-mail communication, March 7, 2013).  
 
 The guards’ authority to search serves as one way to legally enforce the informal 
norms of exclusion by stopping people based on their presentation of self. As my 
informants noted, this is because rich and poor Filipinos are easily identified via their 
clothing, shoes, and general appearance. These taken-for-granted differences are evident 
to workers and visitors alike. The policing of the gate and the marketing of the SBFZ 
ensures that this space is a segmented marketplace, replicating hierarchies based on class 
and nationality,9 from which the poor are kept out, and visitors who stay inside do not 
encounter the vast poverty that dots the landscape right outside the gates. 
 Denying entrance is just one way to enforce this norm of exclusion. The other is 
preferential treatment of foreigners. For example, in my daily trips to and from the SBFZ, 
I was never stopped by a guard nor did I ever see another foreigner stopped, whether they 
were military or civilian, and regardless of their race/ethnicity or skin color. Additionally, 
along with their dependents, any foreigner who is able to invest at least $250,000 in the 
SBFZ, or any foreign retirees who have a pension or who work less than 750 hours during 
the year but make at least $50,000, can be granted a permanent SBFZ resident visa, 
circumventing the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (Subic Bay 
Metropolitan Authority, 1992). All of this constitutes an institutionalized and very visible 
form of segregation and preferential treatment based on wealth and nationality. It is clear 
to locals that the SBFZ is for foreigners and middle- to upper- class Filipinos. That 
foreigners receive preferential treatment is not an obvious finding. At various times and in 
various places around the world, foreigners are often viewed with suspicion. Yet, in global 
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borderlands, foreigners of varied nationalities are actively cultivated.  
 Indirect Exclusion 
Colonial inequalities also persist today in the form of indirect exclusion of the 
relatively poor via the SBFZ’s spatial layout. The Central Business District (CBD) is the 
main hub of daily activity. It has restaurants, universities, hotels, Harbor Point mall, 
SBMA offices, the boardwalk, docks, and a ferry to Grande Island. These service-based 
places may appear at first glance to be the Philippine equivalent of cosmopolitan canopies, 
places where civility and kindness are institutionalized, regardless of race, class, gender, 
or age (Anderson, 2011), but a closer look reveals that inequalities based on nationalities, 
race/ethnicity, gender, and class are interwoven into these very spaces and interactions. 
Foreigners and Filipinos travel to SBFZ precisely because of these inequalities.  
Reflecting characteristics of American suburban sprawl rather than a more typical 
city in a less-developed country (Duany, Plater-Zyberk and Speck, 2010; Drakakis-Smith, 
2000), the areas within the FZ are arranged into distinct clusters for technical, 
manufacturing, shipping, service, and retail businesses. Leaving the main hub of the CBD 
requires transportation. Popular Philippine modes of public transportation such as 
jeepneys (originally American WWII jeeps), trikes (motorcycles with side cars for 
passengers), and pedicabs (bicycles with side cabs for passengers or cargo) are not 
allowed in the FZ. Because two of the main duty-free stores, Royal Subic and PureGold 
Duty Free, are in Gateway Park, about a 5- to 7-minute drive away from the CBD, the 
companies provide free shuttles for shoppers. There are also small, white shuttles that 
serve the same functions as jeepneys, with fare-based transportation with specified routes. 
However, they are stripped of the personalized decorations that characterize jeepneys.  
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Three highways, Rizal, Argonaut, and Corregidor, link these various areas 
together, but aside from the free shuttles to the duty-free stores, employer-provided 
transportation, and the white shuttles, expensive taxis or private vehicles are the only 
means of travel. These are financially out of reach for the vast majority of Olongapo City 
residents. An average family of 4.5 living in Central Luzon made 139,000 Php (Philippine 
pesos), or $3,390, in 2009 (Philippines National Statistical Coordination Board, 2009). 
This translates to 386Php or $9 per day for the entire family. Taxi rides start at 50Php 
around the CBD. A one-way ride to Zoobic Safari costs 400Php, more than an entire 
family’s daily income. Taking into account the cost of transportation and not including the 
price of admission (500Php per person), a fun-filled day at the zoo is out of the question 
for most. 
The SBFZ also has three gated residential communities. Living in these areas 
requires vehicular transportation. Domestic workers travel on the aforementioned shuttles, 
and although residents could also use these shuttles, in practice they do not. Transportation 
is another marker of distinction. The location of these communities serves two purposes: 
blocking residents who are unable to afford the more expensive SBFZ rent, and not 
allowing unwanted persons into the area. It prevents involuntary class/ethnic interaction. 
These communities and other SBFZ establishments that cater to foreigners and upper-class 
Filipinos also maintain standard American amenities such as an American toilet with a lid, 
toilet paper, running water, hot water, and air conditioning.  
Despite being located within the SBFZ, the bathrooms in the SBMA office 
buildings do not have toilet seats, nor do they offer toilet paper. In contrast to the 
buildings catering to foreigners and upper-class Filipinos, these buildings maintain the 
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norms of bringing your own toilet paper and squatting over the toilet that are ubiquitous in 
Philippine places outside the SBFZ. Similarly, while the beach alongside the boardwalk in 
the CBD is free to use, there is at least one SBFZ hotel and beach that, similar to beach-
front resorts and hotels located on the National Highway running from Olongapo City to 
surrounding barangays (neighborhoods), charges admission to use the beach and for toilet 
paper. In general, the SBFZ borders signify a place for rich Filipino and foreigners. 
However, within it there also are differences in basic amenities and services based on who 
is intended to use them—upper or middle class Filipino visitors, Filipino workers, or 
foreign visitors.   
CULTURAL PRACTICES OF PLACES 
Are there particular cultural practices or artifacts of the American military that 
continue today or have local Filipinos erased the memory of the former base? I argue that 
the institutional memory of the American bases continues to influence the cultural 
practices of the SBFZ, and that elite Filipinos purposefully institutionalized this memory 
to distinguish the SBFZ from Olongapo City. Three of the most visible examples that 
derive from the U.S. military concern the maintenance of order: (1) preservation and 
development of American and modern facilities, (2) cleanliness and litter and (3) traffic 
patterns.10 
The SBMA governs the SBFZ and is accountable to the President of the 
Philippines, not the Olongapo City government. Past and present SBMA officials, rather 
than try to cover up any stigmas or associations with the U.S., strive to maintain and 
preserve the institutional memory of the American bases through rules regarding the 
construction of buildings. American symbolism is present in urban and semi-rural 
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locations in the Philippines, where various forms of media are in English, and American 
food, drink, and clothing brands are popular. For example, Coca-Cola is found in small 
sari-sari stores. Similarly, the SBFZ’s “aesthetics of politics” (Mosse, 1991) weave 
together American and Filipino myths and symbols that simultaneously refer to the base as 
a mythic institution rooted in Olongapo’s past and present, and to the economic, social, 
and cultural progress of Filipinos and their future.  
The American military left behind more than 1,800 housing units that were 
converted into three long-term residential communities: Cubi, which houses mostly 
foreigners, and Binictican and Kalayaan, which both have Filipino and expatriate residents 
(interview with SBMA Law Enforcement Department staff member, September 14, 2012). 
Guidelines prohibit residents from changing the façades of their homes because SBMA 
wants “to preserve the architectural features,” which are military in nature (Subic Bay 
Metropolitan Authority, 2011, p.14). Furthermore, the majority of SBFZ facilities use 
former American buildings without making substantial changes to their structure or 
appearance (see Figure 3). They do this not only to avoid costs and maintain architectural 
integrity and infrastructure for utilities, but also strategically and symbolically to link the 
SBFZ to the U.S. and distance it from Olongapo, which signals the availability of up-to-
date facilities to potential business partners. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 These differences are visible to all from the SBFZ borders. For example, the 
Kalaklan Gate, at the far end of the CBD, borders the Olongapo City cemetery and is 
along a major roadway that connects Olongapo City to surrounding barangays 
(neighborhoods). From the bridge at Kalaklan Gate, I turn to view the SBFZ, and find that 
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buildings have large spaces in between them and are built with solid materials; there are 
clean roads with road signs and surface markings. Standing in the same spot, I turned 
around and looked into Olongapo City. The differences are immediately apparent—there 
are closely packed houses built with leftover materials (such as tin), and garbage alongside 
the street, residences, and river. These differences can also be seen alongside Rizal 
Highway within the SBFZ, which runs over one of Kalaklan River’s many drainage 
canals. During my fieldwork, I rode a shuttle over this river weekly. On the SBFZ side, 
there are boats and yachts docked at the Subic Bay Yacht Club’s pier. A glance to the 
other side shows houses made of tin.  There is a stark contrast between the rich inside and 
the poor on the outside.  
 But these differences go beyond snapshots comparing the inside and outside of the 
SBFZ. Officials use strict enforcement of rules and regulations as another way to 
institutionalize the memory of the base within its old borders. This includes the absence of 
mga pulubi (beggars), street children, and stray animals, as well as the maintenance of 
sanitation standards for housing and businesses, the presence of armed SBMA police and 
security personnel, and the absence of public urination (Subic Bay Metropolitan 
Authority, 2011; Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, 2009). Gloria, a white married 
American woman who makes approximately 30,000 USD per year and shuttles between 
the SBFZ and Taiwan for business, marks the boundaries between SBFZ and Olongapo by 
exclaiming that she cannot leave the SBFZ without seeing public urination and the abuse 
of animals.  
One of the first differences between inside and outside the SBFZ that Filipino 
workers, Filipino visitors, and foreign visitors mention is its cleanliness. Just as the SBFZ 
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lacks mga pulubi, the poor, and street children, it also lacks litter. In the Philippines, 
although there are general environmental laws and programs that prohibit littering 
(Philippines, 1975; Philippines, 1997; Philippines, 2001), the norm is to throw trash on the 
ground as you walk. In American suburbs, littering is an invisible action (Murphy, 2012), 
but here I have witnessed people hold onto trash as they walk through the SBFZ, only to 
throw the litter on the ground as soon as they pass through the bridge and enter Olongapo 
City. Although a lack of institutional collection or trashcans contributes to the 
accumulation of litter (Murphy, 2012), it does not account for the presence of all litter. For 
example, the SM mall and other small stores right outside the SBFZ have trashcans 
outside their storefronts while they are open, and they employ workers to clean inside and 
outside the store. Yet litter remains, often right next to the trashcans. Additionally, a peek 
inside the SBMA trashcans shows that often they are not filled with garbage, but rather 
with leaves, sticks, and Styrofoam or plastic containers. The presence of trashcans does 
not automatically mean that litter is placed in these receptacles.  
The SBFZ’s general absence of litter results from a combination of enforcement of 
environmental laws within the SBFZ, the hiring of workers to clean the area, and the 
institutional legacy of the military base. Filipino and foreign visitors and workers consider 
this a good thing. When the base was operational, American rules prohibited trash on the 
ground, and when the Americans withdrew, people continued this practice not only 
because of continuing laws—the first SBMA chairman strictly implemented the rules and 
regulations to preserve these behaviors—but also because it had become routinized. But 
such practices are more strictly enforced in some areas than in others. For example, near 
the gated entrances and within and around businesses, litter is absent. However, a walk 
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around various parts where there is not a lot of foot traffic and visitors shows that certain 
pockets of the SBFZ do accumulate litter. The institutional legacy of the military does not 
evenly influence the cultural practice of littering . The absence of peers who are 
committed to maintaining these practices, police who routinely enforce these rules, and 
foreigners, for whom at least some of the cleanliness is cultivated, lead to the 
disintegration of these legacies. 
The differences in cultural practices of order and disorder extend not only to 
littering, but also to traffic.  The contrast is noted by workers and visitors of different 
nationalities.  Outside the SBFZ, jeepneys, trikes, pedicabs, cars, and vans zigzag across 
roads, crosswalks, and driving lanes, which serve only as loose guidelines. At important 
intersections, police help direct traffic, while traffic lights are obeyed depending on time 
of day, location, and degree of congestion. Inside the SBFZ, however, rules are more 
strictly enforced—drivers must come to a full stop at intersections with stop signs or red 
lights; yield to drivers who have the right of way; pull over for emergency vehicles; use 
proper lanes; obey speed limits; wear seat belts, and have a valid driver’s license, vehicle 
registration, and SBFZ vehicle decals.  
Violating these rules incurs a warning on the first offense, and subsequent 
violations can receive up to a 5,000Php fine. Guards at major intersections and driving 
entrances maintain lists of violators so they can be informed of their offense via mail or 
upon their next entrance (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, 1992; interview with SBMA 
Law Enforcement Department staff member, September 14th, 2012). However, as in the 
case of litter, these laws are less strictly enforced in unpopulated places. 
MORALITY WITHIN PLACES 
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 Order and disorder also carry moral connotations, so that the boundary is not just 
spatial but moral. As Douglas (2008 [1966]) shows, practices and moral discourses of 
pollution and cleanliness reinforce social relations and stratification. What meanings do 
SBFZ local workers, local visitors, and foreign visitors give to this space? Do they 
reinforce the stratification of the SBFZ and Olongapo vis-à-vis the aforementioned 
cultural practices? I argue that moral discourses of who and what are “good” and “bad” 
contribute to the maintenance of the social and physical boundaries that differentiate the 
SBFZ from Olongapo City and the type of people that visit and work in both places.  
 The legacies of the American military continue to influence these distinctions in two 
ways. First, the Filipinos I spoke with—both those who were SBFZ workers and visitors 
as well as those who had never visited the SBFZ—continue to refer to it as “the base,” 
maintaining its distinction from Philippine society and as a place for foreigners and elite 
Filipinos. Below, I describe how the base and U.S. comparisons continue to influence 
these discourses through perceptions of work. Second, the cultural practices of building 
maintenance, littering, and traffic correspond to constructions of the SBFZ as “good” 
while Olongapo City is disordered and “bad.” My interviewees, regardless of nationality, 
appreciated the order and cleanliness that differentiate the SBFZ. For example, Theo, a 22 
year old Black South African single missionary whose church raised money for him to go 
on this mission, describes these differences:  
The difference between Freeport and Olongapo City is like the Egypt land and the Promise 
land, it’s much different.  Freeport is much clean and much controlled because it was a 
navy place and also the nice mall that they built it, the Ayala Mall…but outside the 
Freeport, Olongapo is nice because of SM Mall, but it’s controlled, and compared [to] 
here, you have a lot of poverty in Olongapo when it's compared with Freeport…in 
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Olongapo, you see the real world.  You see the people in the streets. 
 
 Two female SBFZ visitors, who are also former SBNB workers, explained the 
differences between working during the base’s era and working in the contemporary FZ. 
Aida, 61 years old, married, and with two children, and Marilyn, 51, single and with one 
child, are friends, and both agreed when Marilyn told me that the base was “mas maganda 
na ‘yon kasi alam mo, mataas ang labor. Kasi we were paid by hour” [it was better then 
because, you know, higher wages. Because we were paid by the hour]. This is an 
important distinction, since Philippine businesses pay employees by the day, not the hour. 
Additionally, they received, as Aida put it, “Actual training ‘yun. Mga actual training” 
from the military. Marilyn expands, “May certificate from the U.S. Department of Labor, 
because we were under the U.S. Navy … Kami, sa isang quarter, merong three weeks na 
schooling, merong exam, grade, English, Science, Mathematics and drawing” [We have a 
certificate from the U.S. Department of Labor because we were under the U.S. 
Navy…We, in one quarter, have three weeks of schooling, there were exams, grades, 
English, Science, Mathematics and drawing]. Furthermore, the military provided safety 
shoes and goggles and instituted five-day workweeks and eight-hour workdays.  
However, Aida and Marilyn cannot understand Chinese and Korean businessmen, 
and note how these visitors ignore Filipino overtures of friendliness. Compared to their 
experiences with East Asians, they say “it was easier to communicate then [with 
Americans during the operation of the base], because most Filipinos speak both English 
and Tagalog. Now, very few [of us] could speak, let’s say, Korean or Chinese.” Aida and 
Marilyn cannot understand Koreans when they speak, who in turn, do not understand 
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Aida’s and Marilyn’s greetings when they pass each other on the street. In contrast, “the 
Americans … will greet you, ‘Hello!’ ‘Have a nice day!’ ‘Good morning!’” 
 Local workers at Harbor Point also described the differences between the SBFZ and 
Olongapo. They explained why they preferred to work inside versus outside of it—
because it is “more organized,” “hospitable,” “strict,” “safer, better secured,” and 
“civilized”; they “control the people” and it is a “good place to work” with “work [that is] 
more stable.”  
However, it is important to add caveats to these descriptions. These discourses are 
particular to the form of work—Harbor Point is based on interaction with Filipino and 
foreign customers. In contrast, I have witnessed SBFZ construction workers illegally wear 
flip-flops while working.  Additionally, workers in the shipping and manufacturing 
industry are vulnerable to abuse. For example, the SBFZ company, Hanjin Shipping, is 
known for the abuse of workers’ rights, including physical abuse, mistreatment, 
inadequate breaks, and death. This was explained to me in my interviews, and is also seen 
in newspaper accounts and court cases (e.g. Philippines, 2011; Torres, 2012).  Thus, the 
strict implementation of SBFZ rules that Harbor Point employees cite does not necessarily 
apply to all types of work. I argue that part of this discrepancy is due to the level of 
visibility for each type of work. Harbor Point workers, and how they are treated, are 
visible to rich customers; however, the conditions of shipping and manufacturing factories 
are not subject to the same daily scrutiny, making employees more vulnerable.  
 The rules that regulate the most visible parts of the SBFZ and make it a preferable 
place to work for Harbor Point employees, also apply to foreigners. David, an 18-year-old, 
single mixed-Native Hawaiian naval mechanic in port did not like the strictness and 
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commercialization of the SBFZ and preferred the neighboring Barrio Barretto. He 
illustrated the difference:  
Me and my friend, we're in Olongapo. We were drinking.  We walked by into the Freeport 
Zone. It was like 11:30 where I have to be back by midnight … We started walking back and 
my friend starts throwing up. Fuck. Looking at it, he's just throwing them all over the place … 
Then he decided he wants us to go and take a pee.  So he starts peeing in a park by a tree … 
and like this asshole coming by and saying, "I'm going to call the police."  "Well, he's drunk. 
Just leave him alone ... I was like, "He can barely walk.  He doesn't even know what a toilet is 
right now." He started calling the police.  It's just my friend got drunk and he couldn't walk 
anymore. I was drunk as shit too.  I was like–I put him over my shoulder and I started running 
with him on my shoulder. I don't know how I did it … It was dumb because that guy … he's 
going to call the cops he just started calling him. I got mad at that because he's like–out in 
Barrio Barretto … I'm like, the locals would just be like, "I was just going here." "Just go in 
the bathroom here. It's all right." They understood … and they're just trying to help us out. 
That's what I like about Barrio Barretto, they help you out compared to this fuck–I hated it.  
 
 According to SBMA Law Enforcement Department (LED) statistics, there were 295 
crime incidents in 2007, 195 in 2008, 116 in 2009, 128 in 2010 and 106 in 2011. In 2012, 
from January to June, there were 23 incidents, 48% (11 of 23) were related to theft. The 
LED does not keep track of the nationalities of perpetrators or victims. In comparison, the 
Olongapo City Police Department reported 2,195 crime incidents in 2011, which 
represents a crime rate of 898 incidents per 100,000 people, higher than the national 
figure; 80% (1,094 of the index crimes) were related to robbery and theft.12 The SBFZ 
covers more land—262 square miles compared to Olongapo City’s 71.5 square miles, and 
is less densely populated—it is home to 6,124 residents,13 whereas Olongapo City 
contains 247,842 residents. 14 Although these figures suggest that the SBFZ has less crime 
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across more area than Olongapo City, they do not take into account the number of visitors 
to the SBFZ—an estimated 4 million in 2011–or unreported crimes.  
 Tracy, a white, 63 year old single Canadian who has worked in the SBFZ since its 
creation had a different perception of crime:  
[SBMA police] don’t enforce [laws] anyway so it doesn’t matter. Sorry. I know I sound 
really negative but it’s just–where you get a bigger influx of people of course there’s 
more crime, if you will, mostly petty crime but copper theft is a huge problem here.  
Anything that’s got copper in it, street lights, sometimes two kilometers of street lights 
will not be working, we find out because they're stealing the wires constantly, which is a 
shame. Law enforcement officials here are civil servants and they don’t care, [there are] 
photo[s] of them sleeping, playing Angry Birds at work on the computers, and watching 
somebody burn the rubber off, then the cables, to get the wires. The perimeter fence that 
surrounds the Freeport it’s all been cut with bolt cutters and people just walk through ... 
 
The newspaper and website Subicbaynews.net similarly report, with photographic 
evidence, how SBMA police will stand by while thieves steal cable wires.15  
 Local workers, local visitors, and foreign visitors also assign moral meanings in 
their discourse on the SBFZ’s institutionalized practices related to littering and traffic. For 
example, Boy, the aforementioned Filipino contractor with the SBMA, who is divorced 
with three children, said “the traffic rules is a good example, here everybody follows the 
traffic. The moment you step up in the gate. It’s good in FZ … I think there in FZ is much 
more order, as a practice to continue [the] orderly [nature of the] military base to the 
economic zones.” Harbor Point workers also note that another reason they prefer working 
within the SBFZ is that it is “spacious” and “clean.” Tom, a white single American tourist 
who said he was in Subic “for the beautiful women” described these differences from a 
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foreigner’s perspective:  
I like the mall here because it's clean and organized and there's no pollution … of course, 
it's pretty obvious you're riding a bus and you see the Freeport.  When you first come, 
you know exactly what it is … It's a nice mall, it's a nice coffee shop, clean, and it's not a 
bad place to come hangout for a while … I don’t like driving around over in Olongapo 
because there are so many jeepneys and there [is] so much pollution in there. 
 
 But, to local Filipino SBFZ visitors, the influx of more locals is threatening the 
cultural practices and moral discourses that maintain the distinction between the SBFZ 
and Olongapo City. Filipino and foreign visitors who were linked to the former base 
expressed frustration about the appearance of so many local Filipinos, because, in their 
view, the rules, regulations, and behavioral practices that have maintained the ordered 
status quo were disintegrating. During the holiday season, with the Night Market 
attracting shoppers who otherwise would not enter the SBFZ, garbage littered the nearby 
sidewalk and street. Roberto, a 30-year-old Filipino SBFZ visitor whose mother and father 
worked at the former base, related this anxiety:   
Maybe what I generally fear is having Harbor Point [mall], [there is] a lot more people 
who aren’t from here, you know? Because if you’re from Olongapo or Subic, you know. 
Everyone knows everyone basically if you’re from here. But now, there’s so many new 
faces. You don’t know right away, who they are. First, you just think, oh no, they’re not 
from here?! So what I fear is over population since there’s a lot of visitors that don’t know, 
in general, the rules and regulations here. I fear that the discipline inside here will vanish. 
Because of course, some other people throw their waste or garbage in random places. But 
us, generally, we're not like that. We don't spit on the floor. Normally we don't do that.16 
 
However, after the Nigh Market season ended and the vendors and their tents were 
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removed from this space, workers were once again hired to clean the area, suggesting that 
the practices that make the SBFZ distinct will remain. The discipline, safety, and security 
of the former base bleeds into the perception of the SBFZ, which celebrated its 20th 
anniversary in 2012, and the increase in the number of Filipinos due to the opening of the 
Harbor Point mall that same year is threatening to local residents who nostalgically 
remember the base and perceive that lingering cultural practices and moral discourses are 
disintegrating.  
CONCLUSION  
 Place, as a geographical location filled with meaning, influences behavior and 
culture (Gieryn, 2000; Paulsen, 2004). The spatial organization of places has distinct 
consequences related to patterns of segregation, which are reinforced through cultural and 
moral boundary-making practices and discourses (Massey and Denton, 1993; Lamont and 
Molnar, 2002).  
 Global borderlands are a particular type of place—semi-autonomous, foreign-
controlled geographic locations geared toward international exchange (Reyes, in press). A 
study of the place-making of global borderlands allows me to investigate how foreign 
control influences place-making dynamics. The Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Philippines 
provides a strategic case for understanding the significance of global borderlands because, 
as home to two types of global borderlands, the former U.S. Subic Bay Naval Base and its 
current form as a Freeport Zone, one sees how multiple forms of foreign-control influence 
local dynamics.  
Overseas military bases and Freeport Zones are often associated with negative 
traits and consequences (Enloe, 2000 [1990]). However, they are not universally unwanted 
 36 
(Cooley, 2008); indeed, local elites often cultivate varied types of global borderlands in 
their communities. Although much of the related research focuses on people and practices 
excluded from these sites, I am interested in those that are included—for example, SBNB 
and SBFZ local workers, local visitors, foreign visitors—and how they understand these 
spaces, their meanings, and the practices within them. Examining those that are included 
shifts the focus from exclusion, and whether global borderlands are “good” or “bad” for 
development, to one highlighting complexity and a nuanced understanding of these 
spaces.  
Since the SBFZ occupies the same physical space as the former SBNB, I can also 
examine how colonial cultural practices, discourses, and socio-spatial organization 
influence contemporary life. Practices and discourses related to the SBFZ evoke images of 
Olongapo City as different and “bad” in comparison. Although Special Economic Zones 
around the world have practices that differentiate them from surrounding communities, 
what I have shown is how the SBFZ’s practices and discourses are also rooted in its 
physical and discursive history as a former U.S. military base. They are maintained not 
only because SBMA officials purposely institutionalized particular practices associated 
with the former base through the hiring of workers to clean and police the area, and the 
enforcement of related rules and regulation but also because these practices had become 
routinized and normalized for SBFZ workers and visitors, who also continue to maintain 
the discursive separation of the SBFZ from Olongapo City.  
This continued distinction between the SBFZ and Olongapo City was not an 
obvious outcome. When the U.S. military withdrew, there was the possibility that the 
space would be more inclusive to Filipinos in the area. Local elite Filipinos took over the 
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SBNB and helped transform it into a FZ, and Philippine Republic Act 7227, which created 
the SBFZ, specifies that money from the SBFZ will be designated for improvements to the 
surrounding area. However, Filipino elites used its socio-spatial organization to continue 
to perpetuate longstanding inequalities. The recent agreements between the SBMA and the 
U.S. military regarding the U.S. military returning and taking over the currently unused 
SBFZ international airport may only increase and sharpen these divides, reviving the more 
stringent divisions from the base’s colonial era, though this is an empirical question.   
Since the place-making of global borderlands continues to evolve, a primary focus 
of researchers should be the continued investigation of the influences of the past on places, 
rather than on a single snap shot in time. For example, research on Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone shows the evolution of the Zone to a city-like space with internal 
stratification and regional connections (Sklair, 1991; Bach, 2010). Similarly, future 
research on varied types of global borderlands can highlight how people may evoke 
differing discourses and practices from the past, depending on the place’s current form 
and uses.  
This analysis adds to the growing literature on place by demonstrating how the 
legacy of the past has lasting influence on interactions, practices, and discourses even after 
places are transformed from their original use. It shows how places of power have 
structural and spatial residues that reverberate in the present era, often in ways people take 
for granted. Places that change ownership can simultaneously be adapted for new uses 
while maintaining legacies from their original use.  Understanding the legacies of place 
and power is complex, since they are the result of the original place’s socio-spatial 
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organization, use, and the meanings people attributed to it, as well as the relationship the 
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1 Although billed by Marcos and herself as only a housewife, Aquino was part of the Conjuangcos dynasty. 
2 Mt. Pinatubo changed negotiations. R.P. officials wanted the same compensation previously agreed upon. 
The U.S. refused and lowered its offer; R.P. officials accused them of exploiting their vulnerability (United 
States, 1991:22).  
3 Aquino supported and attended the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security on 
August 27, 1991 
4 Before the vote Aquino tried to demonstrate their importance via a people’s march and Senate lobbying 
5 For data on imports and exports: Observatory of Economic Complexity at the MIT Media Lab: 
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/explore/tree_map/hs/export/phl/show/all/2012/, last accessed August 4, 2014. 
6 Non-military aid; http://usoda.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do, Military aid: 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm, last accessed August 4, 2014. 
7 Aetas have been excluded since Spanish colonization. The SBFZ lies on ancestral lands and in 2009, the 
Ambala tribe was given legal authority over 10 acres of land.  
8 However, unlike Brazil and the United States, the Philippines does not officially recognize racial or skin 
color differences through the census. Rather, the state tracks differences by regions and provinces, which 
highlight different ethno-linguistic groups; these have some relation to skin color differences. 
9 Although the interaction between the different races/ethnicities of Americans and different ethnicities/skin 
colors of Filipinos is an important dynamic, it is not the focus of this paper. 
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10 Gender is an important component of dynamics within and outside the SBFZ. However, my focus is on 
particular cultural practices, not on intimate relationships (young Filipina women, older white or black 
American, white Australian, or Japanese men). I address these relationships in another paper. 
11 All names are pseudonyms, 
12 http://www.olongapocity.gov.ph/ProtectiveService3.html, accessed 2/5/14 
13 Land: http://invest.mysubicbay.com.ph/major-districts; residents: 
http://live.mysubicbay.com.ph/residents/residents-profile, accessed 2/5/14 
14 Land: http://www.olongapocity.gov.ph/Geo.html; residents: 
http://www.olongapocity.gov.ph/Demography.html, accessed 2/5/14 
15 http://subicbaynews.net/?p=2940, accessed 1/30/13  
16 In Tagalog: “Siguro what I’m just generally fearing off is dahil may Harbor Point, dumadami na ‘yung 
hindi taga-rito. Alam mo ‘yon? Kasi, ikaw kilala mo kung taga-Olongapo, ‘pag taga-Subic gano’n. 
Everybody knows everybody basically if you’re from here. But now, there’s so many new faces. ‘Di ba 
parang alam mo agad, ay hindi ‘to taga-dito. Unang tingin mo pa lang, ay naku, hindi ‘yan taga-dito, alam 
mo. So what I’m fearing of is baka mag-over populate and since maraming visitors na hindi alam, in 
general, kung ano ‘yung mga rules and regulation dito. Baka ang fear ko lang isa, mawala ‘yung disiplina. 
Kasi, syempre ‘yung iba tapon ng tapon. Sa’min generally, hindi kami gano’n” 
